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1. 	Borrower: The Covernment of the Republic of Korea (ROKG).
 
ImnlementinR Avencies: The inistry of Agriculture and Forestry
 
(AF); The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). 
2. 	Amount: Not to exceed $14 million.
 
3. 	Terms: Principal to be repaid over a period of 40 years, including
 
a lO-year grace Period; interest to be repaid semi-annually, hegin­
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rate of 2% per annum during the grace period and 3% per annum there­
after. 
4. Description of Activity to be Financed: Proceeds of the loan will 
be used to finance the procurement of U.S. coimmodities (and related 
services) which generate an equivalent amount of local currency(won) for agricultural credit. Credit will be provided to farmers 
and farm cooperatives to finance (a) domestically-produced small­
scale farm equipment, and (b) improved storage facilities.
 
5. 	 Purnose: The purpose of this loan is two-fold: (a) provision of
 
aericultural credit, thereby increasing food production, and (b)
 
Balance-of-Payments assistance to the ROKC.
 
6. 	Estimated Cost of Activity: $14 million.
 
7. 	 Other Sources of Financinp: Financing, on comparable terms, for 
these nurnoses is not known to be available from other free-world 
sources (see Section I.B.). 
8. 	Statutory Criteria: All statutory criteria have been met (see
 
Annex III).
 
9. 	 Mission Views: The Mission supports this activity and recommends
 
approval of this loan.
 
10. 	 Issues: There are no issues presented by this loan proposal. 
11. 	 Recommendation: Authorization of a loan in an amount not to exceed $14 million to the ROIKG in accordance with the terms and conditions 
stated in the draft loan authorization (Annex IV). 
iv
 
Loan Cnmmittee
 
USAID/Korea:
 
Chairman: Thomas F. Olmstead, Assistant Director for
 
Economic Affairs, and Staff
 
Athos G. Revelle, Assistant Director for Program
 
Implementation, and Staff
 
Francis Jones, Chief, Rural Development Division, and Staff
 
Thomas E. Johnson, Chief, Developmlent Loan Division
 
Theodore D. Carter, Regional Legal Advisor
 
J. Henry Weigel, Private Enterprise Advisor
 
AID/Washington:
 
Loan Officer: Richard B. Perry, EA/CDF
 
Agricultural Development Advisor: 
 Francis J. LeBeau, EA/TECH
 
Country Desk: 
 Chester Bell & Priscilla Boughton, EA/NEAP
 
Legal Counsel: Charles W. T. Stephenson, GC/EA
 
Economic Advisor: Harold Shafron, EA/DP
 
Drafted by: 
 Members of the Committee
 
AlD-DLc/P-967 
May 21, 1971
 
I. The Proposed Loan: Purpose and Background
 
A. Purpose
 
The purpose of this loan is two-fold: (1) the provision
 
of agricultural credit, which will contribute to an increase in
 
food production, and (2) Balance-of-Payments (BOP) assistance.
 
Credit, in the amount of $14 million equivalent, will be
 
provided to Korean farmers and farm cooperatives to finance (1) farm
 
mechanization, and (2) improved storage facilities. Insufficient
 
credit for these agricultural inputs has been identified as a major
 
obstacle to increased food grain production. Administration of the
 
credit program will be carried out by the National Agricultural
 
Cooperative Federation (NACF), an institution of considerable impor­
tance to the Korean farmer. NACF is the major source of institutional
 
rural credit, the sole supplier of fertilizer and a major supplier
 
of other farming needs. The organization of NACF and its capacity
 
to implement this credit program are discussed in Part III of this
 
paper.
 
Inasmuch as the entire $14 million in credit needs repre­
sent local currency costs, the method of generating the required
 
currer. I accomplishes the other puirpose of the loan, i.e., BOP
 
assistance to the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) through the
 
financing of basic import reJtirements. The ROKG is making progress
 
in reducing the BOP deficit- the trade gap, for example, is
 
projected to decline from $860 million in 1970 to $306 million in
 
1974. However, near-term demands on Korea's foreign exchange
 
resources are considerable, and foreign capital requiremente will
 
continue at a fairly high level through the next several yeare
 
(estimated to be $590 million in 1974). In sum, it is concluded
 
that BOP assistance to Korea is fully justified. This topic is
 
discussed more thoroughly in Part IV of this paper.
 
B. Background and General Rationale
 
During the past year there has been considerable study of
 
the agricultural sector. In cooperation with the Ministry of
 
Agriculture (MAF), this work has been reviewed by the Mission in a
 
series of studies undertaken either jointly or separately. The
 
purpose of this effort was to identify those areas where a greater
 
impact could be made by AID capital assistance inputs. Because of
 
the importance of the grain sub-sector, it was decided to concentrate
 
in that area. Further examination led to focus on six specific
 
problem areas: price policy, genetic improvement, mechanization,
 
-
1/
A general review of Korea's recent economic performance appears
 
as Annex I.
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storage, fertilizer use, and transportation. After additional
review, three of these were excluded from consideration under this
loan: 
 price policy, because of the complexity and the myriad of
domestic political considerations which need to be settled by the
ROKG; varietal improvement, because the government program in the
development of new rice strains is well advanced and further

varietal research is being considered by the United Nations;
transportation, because the planning and development of the rural
road netowrk will take many more months to complete and coordinate.
The three areas selected, after this elimination process, were
mechanization, storage and fertilizer use, all of which share a
common problem in the lack of credit to finance their optimum
utilization by Korean farmers. 
 Accordingly, in its Letter of Appli­cation for this loan, the ROKG specifically requested that credit
be made available for these three purposes (see Annex II).
 
Further discussions 
- subsequent to the ROKG's Letter of
Application 
­ have led to agreement between the Mission and MAF
that local currency proceeds of the loan be used entirely to finance
mechanization and storage facilities; $8 million equivalent will be
allocated to mechanization, and $6 million to storage. 
 However,
we plan to provide for flexibility in amounts utilized between these
two purposes, subject to A.I.D.'s approval.
 
Although credit for fertilizer will not be provided under
this loan, the Mission feels that increasing the use of fertilizer
is quite important to Korean agriculture. Accordingly, as 
a self­help measure, the ROKG will take steps designed to raise the level
of fertilizer usage (see Annex IV, Part 5.b).
 
Financing for this type of agricultural credit on comparable
terms is not known to be available from other free-world sources at
this time. 
 Neither the IBRD nor the Export-Import Bank of the U.S.
is interested in financing this particular activity. 
 However, the
IBRD has under preliminary consideration a $10 million program of
agricultural credit in Korea for such purposes as 
orchard and seri­culture development, and production of swine and poultry; credit for
mechanization is also being considered. 
The IBRD is fully apprised
of A.I.D.'s proposed loan, and does not feel that any conflict exists
in the area of mechanization. 
The type of equipment which the IBRD
may be willing to finance remains to be identified, and, in any event,
the loan will not go forward until about March, 1972.
 
Korea is also obtaining $15 million ($10 million in 1971;
$5 million in 1972) in Japanese export credits for indistrial raw
materials, textiles and textile equipment; 
the local currency gener­ated will go into agricultural credit, but the specific uses have
not been decided. 
Terms of this financing are: 
 13 years including

a 3-year grace period, interest at 6 
percent. An additional
$5 million in financing for agriculture, fisheries and dairy equip­ment will also be provided by Japan.
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II. 	 Korea's Third Five-Year Plan and this Loan
 
The insufficiency of credit for agricultural purposes in recent
 
years is partially a result of the ROKG's emphasis, under the SFYP,
 
on investment in indusL.ial development in order to increase national
 
income. Now that substantial progress has been made in that direction,
 
the ROKG will give increased priority to the agricultural sector
 
under the TFYP (1972-1976). The Final version of the TFYP will not
 
be released until the summer of 1971. However, a preliminary version
 
has been made available, the agricultural sector highlights of which
 
are indicated below.
 
The Plan has a "Basic Direction" which makes exports, the rural
 
sector, and heavy and chemical industries the major priorities. An
 
annual average GNP growth rate of 8.6% is projected, and the commodity
 
trade gap is to be reduced from $1.0 billion in 1969 to $170 million
 
in 1976. A total investment of 3,896.9 billion won is called for,
 
80.2% of which is to be supplied domestically, and the remaining
 
19.8% from foreign sources. Under the SFYP, 36.4% of the total
 
investment requirement came from foreign sources.
 
With respect to the agriculture sector, the Plan has two broad
 
goals: (1) attaining self-sufficiency in rice and increasing income!,
 
by increasingproduction of food grains and pursuing programs of land
 
rearrangement and form mechanization; (2) improving health and
 
cultural facilities and expanding electrification and road networks
 
to farm and fishing communities
 
In order to meet these goals, specific targets have been set,
 
among which the following are directly or indirectly related to this
 
loan:
 
(1) 	Self-sufficiency in Rice: output will be increased by
 
17.3% from 4,090,000 MT in 1969 to 4,797,000 MT in 1976;
 
(2) 	Use of IR-667: the new rice seed, IR-667 will be
 
planted on 300,000 hectares, starting in 1972;
 
(3) 	Increase in Fertilizer Use: fertilizer use will be
 
increased from 150 kg. per hectare in 1969 to 220 kg.
 
per hectare in 1976.
 
(4) 	Acceleration of Farm Mechanization: the production
 
capacity of farm machinery plants will be expanded,
 
and land under mechanized cultivation will be increased
 
to 450,000 hectares.
 
_/ Average farm household income is projected to increase from W218,000
 
per year in 1969 to W482,000 per year (1969 prices) in 1976.
 
'4 
The priority being given the agriculture sector in the TFYP is
indicated by the large increase in its share of gross investment
from 8.4% under the SFYP to 12.6%, or W480.5 billion for fisheries.

Table I shows the total planned investment in major project sub­sectors, and compares the central government's share of that invest­
ment with the amounts invested and to be invested during the SFYP.
 
In addition to 
that shown in Table I are plans for rural
electrification, water supply improvement, communications and building
improvements, which call for central government investments at levels

six times the amounts so invested during the SFYP.
 
Credit will be a significant factor of investment during the
TFYP. 
 In the Agriculture Sector, the central government's share of
the total investment target is W335 billion, 46% of which (i.e.
billion) is estimated to be in the form of credit. 
154
 
It must be
remembered that the foregoing represent investment targets, not
firm availabilities of funds. 
 Although a breakdown of the "credit

sub-sector" and identification of funding sources is still being
developed by the ROKG, the overall dimensions of agricultural credit
insufficiency are indicated in Table 2, prepared by the Mission.
The agriculture sector's "GNP" has been projected through the end
of the TFYP. 
Based on historical trends and percentage relationships
between the sector GNP, total agricultural credit outstanding and

agricultural credit from institutional sources, a credit gap has
been estimated and projected through the end of the TFYP. 
Although
the proposed input of $14 million equivalent is not overly impressive
in terms of closing the credit gap, a definite impact will be made,
particularly when viewed within the framework of the specific credit

needs for mechanization and storage../ 
 Further, the proposed loan,

when combined with other planned inputs to 
the sector 
- which were
outlined in Part I.B. 
­ constitutes a significant contribution to
Korea's overall needs for agricultural credit.
 
Korean self-sufficiency in the grain sector and agricultural credit to
support that sector have been identified-in World Bank studies 
as
priority 
areas for external and domestic financing. This is further
highlighted by the fact that the World Bank is also ccasidering loans
for agricultural credit in Korea, including possible assistance in the
field of farm mechanization (as noted above
 
1/=See Part III.B
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TABLE
 
Investment Targets 

- Major Agricultural Sub-Sectors 
Third Five Year Plan
 
1972-1976
 
Third Five Year Plan 
 Actual Govt.% Increase
 
Total Planned Central 

Supply of New Rice Strains 

Paddy Rearrangement 

Irrigation 

Large Estates Development 

Farm Mechanization 

Extension & Guidance 

Livestock 

Forestation & Erosion Control 

Fishing Boats 

Production Facilities 

Total 

Investment .on)
Got.  
I-Govt. 
 Share SFYPShare
 
9,179 9,179 1,323 
 693
 
45,374 13,612 
 2,213 615
 
15,026 11,223 33,777 
 33
 
41,657 40,252 
 3,218 1,250
 
31,972 21,Ll 2,745 
 769
 
18,128 13,424 
 7,955 169
 
35,396 24,288 7,966 
 305
 
22,229 15,000 
 12,599 127
 
64,069 11,265 8,245 
 137
 
6,089 4.626 

-12
 
288,119 164,931 83,544 
 197 
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TABLE 2 
AGRICULTURE SECTOR .NSTIT.TIONAL AM NON-TNSTITUTIONAL , 
CREDIT AND CROI 1971-76 4b 4" 
,a.... 
Billion won-
,'.. 
-
Year 
Agri. 
GNP I/ 
A 
Institu Institu 
tional tional 
credit credit 
as % of out-
G'IP 2/ standing 
(NACF) (A x B) 
B C 
Institu 
tional Estimated 
credit total 
as % of agri. 
total agri.credit 
credit / (C + D) 
D z 
Bilonn 
.. --
Credit Gap in 
gap U.S. 
(E - C) dollars 
F G 
197 600.4 12.4 70.2 30 234.0 163.8 50.4 
197) 
1972 
627.6 
-660.8 
12.9 
13.5 
81.1 
88.5 
31 
32 
261.2 
276.7 
180.1 
188.2 
55.4 
57.9 
1973 
1974 
1975 
690.5 
721.6 
754.0 
13.9 
14.4 
14.9 
96.0 
103.9 
112.3 
33 
34 
35 
290.8 
305.6 
321.0 
194.8 
201.7 
208.7 
59.9 
62.1 
64.2 
1976 788.0 15.4 121.4 36 337.1 215.7 66.4 
a/ Preliminary. 
i.1 1969 prices. 1971 estimate assumes 4.5% growth eqjal to 
growth planned during TFLP. 
2/ Assumes historical trend continues, estimated at 
conservative rate of 0.5% increase annually. 
/ Trend during 1964-70 estimated to continue at 1% 
annually. 
............
. . . ........  
. ,
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III. Loan Justification: Agricultural Credit
 
A. Agricultural Credit in Korea
 
1. 
The National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (NACF)
 
a. Description and Activities
 
The NACF has been carrying out various programs of rural bank­ing, credit and marketing since 1961 when it was organized by the merging

of two agencies which had for many years been separately responsible for

cooperative marketing and agricultural credit. 
It is a very large organiza­
tion made up of a central office, administrative offices in each of the nine

provinces, and affiliated member cooperatives (an organization chart appears

as Figure 1). NACF has approximately 2.2 million members, 93 percent of all
 
Korean farmers.
 
NACF is the major institutional sotuce of rural credit and a

major provider of life and casualty insurance in the rural areas. Accord­ing to recent estimates, NACF handles two-thirds of all farm supplies and
 
approximately 28 percent of farm products entering commercial markets. 
The
 programs of NACF are coordinated with those of the MAF's water and land
 
development agency, the extention service of the MAF and the special develop­
ment projects of the ROKG. Government and other funds are 
loaned through the

NACF to local land improvement associations and to farmers participating in
the special livestock, horticulture, sericulture, mechanization and other
 
programs of agricultural development. General supervision is received from
MAF and the Ministry of Finance for those programs in which the Government
 
has a direct investment.
 
A major reorganization of NACF is underway to reduce the number
 
of village level cooperatives which were 
carrying out only limited functions.
 
In 1962, there were nearly 20,000 small cooperatives. A merger program was

started in 1965 and the target is to have 1,500 myon (township) sized coopera­
tives by the end of 1974. These cooperatives will be the smallest units
 
within the structure. 
The next level is the gun (county) cooperative, made
 
up of several village or myon cooperatives. The gun cooperatives and the
 
special purpose horticulture and livestock cooperatives are federated and
 
form the national organization.
 
In a recent study of Korea's agriculture sector, the IBRD pointed

out the need to strengthen the cooperative system by consolidating small
 
cooperatives into larger more efficient units. 
One requirement of such a

consolidation program is adequate storage facilities at the township level,

which will be the basic "working level" unit of the system, especially in
 
terms of crop storage and marketing. 
The improved storage facilities
financed by this loan, therefore, will contribute to the strengthening of
 
the cooperative system.
 
b. Capacity to Implement the Program
 
The scale of NACF's total business activity indicates its
capability to administer sub-loans financed by this proposed loan. 
Its major
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business activities in 1969 were: agricultural loans granted, $188 million;
sales of farm inputs, $114 million ($6.5 million in farm implements);

marketing of farm products, $90 million. 
The sub-lending proposed herein
represents an acceleration of on-going activities, and it is well within
the administrative capability of NACF to execute this as well as the other
aspects of their operations. 
Tablea shows the value and percentage growth

of NACF business activities.
 
2. The Rural Credit Picture
 
The 1964 Rural Credit Survey
 
A nation-wide credit survey conducted in 1964 indicated that
over ninety percent of all farm households use borrowed money or commodities
and that three-fourths of the borrowings came from private sources, usually
from within the immediate rural area; half of the credit was from other
farmers, friends, and relatives. About two-thirds of this debt is in kind-­rice, barley, and other products. In the aggregate, the amount of local
credit is substantial but its use--57.6 percent for consumption expense, 23.7
percent for farm operating expenses and 18.7 percent for capital expenses-­and the terms and the scale of loans indicate that it is not a very good
credit system for agricultural development. 
The total amount borrowed per
family was about 20,360 won (in 1965 prices) with only about 3,800 won being
used for capital expenditures. 
At the 1965 exchange rate of 270 won to the
U.S. dollar, capital expenditures from borrowed funds were only about $14
for the average farmer. The rate of interest on the private loans was
estimated at about 60 percent per annum, with a wide range of rates depending
upon source of credit and the relationship between creditors and debtors.-L
As one would expect with these interest rates, the private loans were usually
for less than one year and thus not well adapted to most capital investments
 
needed in agriculture.
 
In 1964, institutional credit was about 25 percent of the total,
most of which was supplied by NACF. 
Its short-term production loans were at
interest rates of 10 to 15 percent depending on the source of funds; 
some
long-term irrigation loans were made at 3.5 percent. 
Three-fourths of the
credit program was for short-term credit, and some twenty two percent of the
production credit was diverted to finance consumption by the borrowers.
 
In 1964, the farmers who indicated a need for agricultural credit­about 2/3 of all farmers--estimated credit needs of 5,550 won for short-term
!redit and 14,480 won for intermediate or long-term credit. 
These amounts
were approximately equal to their tot4l actual borrowing, which were used,
however, primarily for priority consumption needs._/ While estimates are not
mate as to how much production would have increased had adequate credit been
available it seems clear that a serious credit bottleneck existed.
 
l/Rural Credit Survey in Korea, National Agricultural

Cooperative Federation Research Dept., Seoul, Korea
 
1965, pp. 61, 70, 184.
 
_/ Ibib., pp. 169, 186, 132-158. 
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TABLE 2a 
-
GROWTH OF NACF BUSINESS ACTIVITIESVALUE AND PERCENTAGE 
Million won
 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
 
Item Value Value change Value change Value change Value change Value chanie
 
Sales of farm chemicals
 
(other than fertilizer) 781 750 -4 818 9 1,282 57 2,539 98 2,327 -8
 
.Sales of farm implements 205 145 -29 539 272 604 12 1,,'23 102 900 -26 
'Feed 150 32 -79 64 100 410 541 619 51 176 -72 
Seed and livestock 527 836 59 964 15 924 -4 1,266 37 780 -38 
Sales'through marketing 
centers 8,768 12,278 40 14,202 16 17,701 25 36,876 108 32,850 -11 
Sales to military forces 791 295 - 820 3 729 -11 806 11 1,375 71 
Sales through handicraft 
centers 97 84 -13 28 -67 26 -7 34 31 18 -47 
Matial insurance 191 735 285 1,512 106 2,357 56 3,671 56 4,978 36 
Deposits 10,641 18,670 75 21.869 17 30,728 41 45,260 47 50,246 1 
oam 22,500 26,355 17 39,797 51 64,346 62 90,624 41 97,246 7 
1965 constant prices. Source: MACF. 
0 
The Supply of Credit Since 1964
 
Since 1964, the volume of credit received by the agriculture sector
 
has increased both absolutely and relatively (Table 3). Total bank loans
 
increased 364.6 percent, from 19.5 billion to 90.6 billion won. Loans to
 
the sector also have become larger relative to GNP originating in the agri­
culture sector, rising from 6.2 percent in 1965 to 12.4 percent in 1970,
 
indicating that farmers are financing a larger share of their production
 
through credit from banking institutions.
 
While NACF is the major lender to farm borrowers and has
 
increased its loans 266 percent since 1965, other lenders have begun to
 
supply agriculture sector credit in significant quantities. NACF's share
 
of total institutional loans made for agriculture fell from about 100 per­
cent in 1965 to 90 percent in 1970. The central Federation of Fisheries
 
Cooperatives and member cooperatives were the only other major lenders
 
whose total loans, including non-agricultural loans, increased (from 1.6
 
billion in 1965 to 13.0 billion won in 1969). The Korea Development Bank
 
also has made a few loans for agricultural purposes.
 
Another new development is NACF's entry into non-agricultural
 
lending. Table 4 shows that 84.8 percent of NACF's loans outstanding were
 
to agricultural borrowers in 1965, whereas only 77.7 percent of its loans
 
were for agricultural purposes in 1970. Total loans by NACF in 1970 were
 
4.7 times the level in 1965, while agricultural loans were only 3.6 times
 
the 1965 level.
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TABIE 3 
AGRICULTURE OUTPUT AND OUTSTANDING BANK OANS
 
TO AGRICULTURE SECTOR
 
flillion-won,Agri­
culture Total Per-
 Total Per­
sector bank Million cent NACF cent 
GNP credit U. S. (B/A) Index credit (E/A) Index E/B
Year (A) (B) al dollars (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
1965 311.6 19.5 72.0 6.2 100 19.7 6.3 100 101 
1966 372.3 23.0 85.2 6.2 117.9 22.7 6.1 115.2 99 
1967 395.5 29.3 106.9 7.4 150.3 27.5 7.0 139.6 94 
1968 454.5 43.2 153.7 9.5 221.5 41.5 9.1 210.2 96 
1969 588.8 69.1 239.9 11.7 354.4 65.4 11.1 331.5 95 
Note: Current market prices. The Agriculture sector includes 
fisheries.
 
a/ Figures from BOK monthly statisties include NACF 
but exclude certain types of NACF loans under 
business operation fund and foreign aid warehouse 
funds. 
October 
:/ December. 
Excludes loans for business operation, foreign aid 
warehouse and general loans. 
/ Preliminary
Source: NACF, and BOK, Monthly Economic Statistics. 
TABLE 4 
NACF LOANS OUTSTANDING BY INDUSTRY 1965-7wa / 
Mill-i on won 
Year 
Total 
Value 
Per-
cent 
Agriculture 
(A) 
Per-
Value cent 
Forestry 
(B) 
Per-
Value cent 
Fishery Sub-total 
(C) (A + B + C) 
Per- Per-
Value cent Value cent 
Manufacturing 
and Other 
Par-
Value cent 
1965 23,259 100 18,896 81.2 290 1.3 525 2.3 19,711 84.8 3,548 15.2 
1966 27,107 100 21,216 78.3 737 2.7 774 2.9 22,727 83.9 4,380 16.1 
1967 34,376 100 24,851 72.3 1,358 4.0 1,347 3.9 27,556 80.2 6,820 19.8 
1968 52,814 100 38,791 73.5 830 1.6 1,919 3.6 41,540 78.7 11,274 21.3 
1969 84,413 
197bX 105,361 
100 
100 
59,626 
75,627 
70.6 
71.8 
1,086 
1,561 
1.3 
1.5 
4,580 
4,634 
5.4 
4.4 
65,292 
81,822 
77.3 
77.7 
19,121 
23,539 
22.7 
22.3 
Note: Current market prices. 
a/ Includes NACF and city and gun cooperatives. 
End of December. 
Source: ACF. 
TABLE 5 
PERCENT INCRFISE IN NACF LOANS OUTSTANDING 
BY INDUSTRY 1 5-70 
Year 
Agri-
culture Forestry Fishery 
Sub-
Total 
Manu-
facturing 
Total 
Loans 
1966 13.3 350.8 
-11.3 13.5 46.6 16.6 
1967 17.3 103.6 110.1 19.8 80.5 25.6 
1968 43.8 
-15.4 63.1 46.2 105.8 53.6 
1969 49.9 17.6 24.5 48.8 97.9 59.6 
1970 24.7 39.7 68.1 26.1 37.0 29.1 
Source: Table 4
 
In spite of a large absolute rise in the amount of credit avail­able to agricultural borrowers and an increase in the ratio of farm
credit to agricultural GNP, agricultural loans became a smaller and
smallbr.share of tctal outstanding credit in 1965-70, declining to

only 14.2 percent in October 1970 (Table 6). 
 This was because manu­facturing and construction industries, particularly, received an
increasing share of all credit along with the transportation, electri­
city, and services industries.
 
TABLE 6
 
LOANS AND DISCOUNTS OUTSTADING OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS, BY 
 IXSTRY 1965-70 
AgricIture Million won 
Forestry Mining &Fishery Quar Mnufacturing ComerceYear Value Other All IndWustry% Value % Value % Value % Value % Value 
1965 19,478 29.1 1,093 1.6 28,841 43.0 12,147 18.1 5,489 8.2 67,048 100.0 
1966 22,989 24.0 1,790 1.9 44,369 46.4 16,903 17.7 9,550 10.0 95,601 100.0 
1967 29,314 38.1 4,263 2.6 80,006 49.3 29,362 18.1 19,254 U.9 
 162,199 100.0 
1968 43,180 26.6 8,347 2.8 337,901 47.3 49,736 17.1 52,440 18.0 291,604 100.0 
1969 69,a30 13.6 10,587 2.1 238,814 47.1 97,104 19.2 91,269 18.0 506,904 100.0 
9702 / 90,643 14.2 12,112 1.9 302,45.6 47.5 118,632 18.6 112,842 17.7 636,685 100.o 
a/ October
 
Source: BOK, 
 Monthly Economic Statistics. 
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Although the proportion of production costs which farmers pay in

cash has increased, the absolute gap between credit needs and available
 
financing may be as great or greater in 1971 than it was in 1964. 
The
 
findings of the 1964 survey relative to sources of credit, terms, and
 
uses probably are still valid for 1970. 
Table 7 and Figure 2 present a
 
more detailed picture of the expansion and subsequent construction of
 
rural credit granted by NACF. Loans granted include new loans and
 
extensions of old loans. 
 Figure 2 shows the lack of significant expansion

of agricultural credit in 1970 and the contraction which may take place

in 1971. This situation is due to the restriction on borrowings allowed
 
under the monetary stabilization programs of the government and difficulty

of generating loanable funds from internal sources.
 
The NACF has estimated that if sufficient loanable funds had been

available in 1970 it could have made sound loans in the amounts and in
 
the categories presented in Table 8.
 
TABLE 7
 
LOANS GRANTED BY NACF AND PLAN FOR 1971
 
Million won in 1965 Constant Pri ces 
Jhst. Plan 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 19702/ 1971 
L Lang-term loap for irrigation (35-40 years, 3.5%) - 1,21I 1,50 J 1, 3.90 219 1,878 
2. Medium-term (1-10 years, 9% interest) 1 67 6,655 8,673 6,930 
(a) Special income enhancement projects. - - - 972 4,606 3,797 2,757 
(b) Cultivation, financing, food increased prod., 
tractors, sprayers & dusters, reclamation, 
pumping facilities and paddy rearrangement. 1,356 945 1,473 1,548 1,941 1,190 740 
(c) Sericulture, financing silkworm house and 
mulberry field creation. 33 186 - 259 221 375 203 
(d) Livestock, barns and pasture development. 208 413 j24 712 1,009 874 246 
(e) Industrial crops, financing facilities for 
mushroom culturing house, ginseng production, 
tobacco leaf drying. 1 15 - - 80 207 278 
(f) Disaster restoration, facilities as 
emergency measures. - - - 1,051 686 285 -
(g) Rural sidelines, facilities to finance 
rural sidelines incame projects. - 46 -
(h) Forestry, financing reforestation and 
tree nurseries. 1 28 62 60 131 142 
(i) Roof improvement 41 57 51 51 70 25 -
3. Short-term (1 year max- U-24% interest, 20-200,000 won 
defending on fund sources) 0 5 .15,7 16,704 17,525 1 02LM 
(a Fam operation fertilizer, chemicals, 
'hand tools, wages and feed 4,842 3,471 4,024 4,345 7,074 3,926 5,888 
(b) Comercial 
processing, 
farming-fert., chem., storage, 
maiketing and transport. - 554 1,439 3,495 2,780 5,628 3,393 
Wc) Rural agencies, financing operational funds for 
Irrigation, nurseries, slkWorm and seedings. 4,219(d) Rice lien, loans on storaged rice. 1,974 5,7481,751 9,0461,251 8,162702 7,59180 3,766 - 1,652 -
/ md of December 1970. 
TABLE 7 (Corxt.!4 
Million won in 1965 Constant Prices 
Est. !/ Plan 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 - 1971 
4. 	 Cooperatives- Fostering (1-5 years, 9-15% interest)___616 79 662 1 J11 1,i4 
(a) 	 Ri/Dong cooperatives, financing

operations and facilities. 
 283 330 276 359 716 1,192 ­(b) 	 Special cooperatives, financing
operations and facilities. 353 469 386 697 407 556 ­
5. 	 Marketing Loans (1 year max., 9% interest) 
- -	 2 24 1 1. 
(a) 	 Collection of agricultural products,
 
financing collection of agr. products for
 
storage and processing. 

-	 56 1,235 980 1,661(b) 	 Feed, financing feed supplies to millers. - - 299 342 1,194 505 81 
6. Export Financing (6 months max. 6% interest). 	 1,763 11.8 1 6 (a) 	 Export preparation, financing funds for 
collection of agr. prod. for export. 
- - - - 1,460 6,475 6,112(b) 	 Letter of Credit, loan financing exports. ­ - - - 303 5,375 8,653 
7. 	 Fisheries (1-5 years 9% interest), loans to
 
fishermen, bait, gear, sma1 boats. 1 
 1 5 8 _ 80 
8. 	 Sub-total (Agriculture, forestry, and fishery). a 16,325 21,91 30,071 
9. 	 Commercial Loans (1 year max., 24% interest,
 
ncn-agri.), savings promotion. 
 5 10,030 160953 275 52.809 5 
10. 	 GRAN~D TOTAL 22,50 26,35 6434 9061~5 9L2.46 3Z 
End 	of December 1970. 
Source:-N.AOF, Credit Planning Section. 
(million won)
 
flOO00 
FIGURE 2
 
100,000 NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE FEDERATION lOANS GRANTED 1965-71 .- -­
90,000 
 Total Loans 
80,000
 
iff70,000
 
60,000 
 J­
50,000 i 
- - Non-Agricultural Loans 
40,000 ­
. /Forestry and Fisherlan 
40,000
 
20,000
 
10,000 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 iq- i9 
Note: Figures include refinanced Loans. a/ PEnd of Dec. 1970. lanned. 
Source: Table 7, 1965 constant prices. 
TABLE S 
ESTIMATED DEMAND FCR NACF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN 1970 
Million won in 1965 prices 
Short-term 

Medium/Long-term
 
Fanning Operational loans 
 Production Facility Loans Warehouse/storage LoanSeeds & seedlings 1.477 Land reclamation & improvement 4.001 Food grainLivestock .3961.334 IrrigationFertilizer 12.718 Pumps .509 Horticultural crops .016
 
Agr. chemicals .275 Special crops .002
2.784 
 Seeds & livestock 
 5.760 Fruits
Feed .2064.748 Barns/sheds etc. (prod.facility) 2.724Irrigation Livestock .013
.825 Attachments to buildings 1.909 Forestry 
.005Wages 
 16.763 Warehouses (farm) 
.245
Small farm implements 3.093 Sprayers 
.493 Sub-totalOthers .6402.435 Tiller 

.918
Sub-Total 
 46.1b2 Processing facility
Rural roof improvement .097

.286 Processing facilities 
Management expensesMarketing Loan Others 1.520ae L fir, Food grains .372 
Horticultural cropsFood grain .0074.516 Sub-Total 19.182 Special crops 
.046
Foo riturnl crops •516Horticultural crops .134 Livestock .105
 
Special crops 
.094 Fruits .004
 Silkworm raising .108Fruits 
.184
Livestock Forestry1.254Sericulture (silkworm 
Sub-Total 

.642

raising)
 
Forestry 

.003
 
Sub-total 6.185 Grand Total 72.331
 
Credit available in 1970: 44,000
 
Source: NACF, Credit Planning Section.
 
0 
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Even if one were to conclude that the demand for credit in 1970 was

somewhat less than estimated or the soundness of the loans questionable, the
fact that the total estimated demand exceeded the available institutional
 
supply of funds by over 60 percent suggests a definite credit shortage in

agriculture. 
Of course, it is not surprising that demand fo2 NACF credit

exceeds the supply when I'ACF provides less than one-third of all farm credit at
 
rates far below the rates of other lenders. An indication of the credit
 
shortage is the expectation that NACF may not be able to continue in 1971
 its average rate of expansion of agricultural credit, which has been increas­
ing annually at about 50 percent of the 1965 level.
 
If one assumes curb (free market) interest rates for short-term
loans--the only kind readily available--which are about 60 percent per year,

it is unlikely that much is being invested in capital equipment or land
 improvement from loans from private lenders. 
With thirty percent of farm

credit from NACF at 15 percent interest, and seventy percent of farm credit
 
at 60 percent interest, the weighted average of 46 percent is higher than
 bank rates, and capital might be expected to flow to agriculture. This does
 
not happen, partially because the 60 percent interest paid is not the net
 
return to lenders, who have considerable losses from high risk without security,

as well as the expenses of making and collecting many small loans, much of

which is for consumption purposes. Furthermore, urban curb rates are reputed

to be equally high and the loans probably less risky. Because non-farm income
is about 70 percent of national income, most loanable funds are generated in

the non-agricultural sector and because intere5t rates are high there also,

these funds tend to remain in the urban sector. The government's push for

economic development in industry with its supporting monetary policy also
 
has contributed to the current credit shortage in agriculture.
 
The rapid expansion of the money supply in 1968 and 1969 forced
 
a subsequent monetary stabilization program in which agricultural credit,
 
among others, was curtailed. CF's problems in borrowing from Bank of Korea

and in getting government appropriations are further complicated by the large

deficit in the fertilizer account which results from circumstances beyond its

control. Borrowing for the fertilizer account must be within the NACF's total
 borrowing ceiling and NACF's other loans are reduced by the deficit in the
 
fertilizer account.
 
In order to generate loan funds for farmers and the rural community,

NACF has engaged in a nation-wide program of commercial banking. 
This
 
program has resulted in considerable sums of money being placed on deposit

and some funds deposited by non-farmers are being used for agricultural loans.
 
But, given normal reserve requirements and the necessity to make commercial
loans to the non-agricultural depositors in order to keep these accounts, the
 
net flow into agriculture, while significant, has not generated the financing

required by a developing agriculture. The trends in non-farm'deposits and
 
loans are illustrative of the relative ease in securing self-generated
 
capital for the non-agricultural sector.
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The Creditworthiness of Farmers
 
Contrary to popular belief, the overdue loan record of the farm sector
 
in October 1970 was better than for any other major industry. Only 7.7 percent
 
of the value of all farm sector loans were overdue while the average for all
 
industry was 11.6 percent. The poorest record was in the mining and quarrying
 
industry where 25.5 percent of the value of all loans were overdue. However,
 
35.2 percent of the number of agricultural loan accounts were overdue,
 
implying that a large part of the small agricultural loans were in default.
 
The number and value of farm loan accounts which are not paid on time
 
fluctuates annually with the yield of the rice harvest. In a moderately good
 
crop year, such as 1970, most loans are repaid promptly.
 
B. The Need for Auricultural Credit
 
1. Farm Mechanization
 
The farm mechanization process commenced only recently in Korea and,
 
as a result, large farm equipment, such as four-wheel tractcrs and combines,
 
are virtually unkno~m. At the end of 1968, only 108 four-wheel tractors were
 
in use. However, there has been, particularly in the last four years, a
 
significant increase in the numbers of small power equipment in use on farms.
 
Even the percentage increase in the number of power tillers has been large ­
above 40 percent each year since 1962 (Table 9). Nevertheless, the absolute
 
level of mechanization is still low with only 12,882 tillers in use in 1970,
 
an average of one tiller for each 194 farm households. The use of power water
 
pumps and power sprayers and dusters is considerably more widespread but there
 
is still only one water pump per 43 farm households. Korea, for example, had
 
only one percent as many tractors and tillers per 1,000 farm households in
 
1970 as Japan had in 1967. The ratio for other farm power equipment is similar.
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TABLE 9 
Powor Sp'ayer3
Power Tilors and nufl r, Powor Threshers Power Pulnp..__ 
n- In- %n-in­
er cn O'tycrase 'ty crease .y r 
10960 L53 -
­
- 3,886 
- 6,911 
­
1961 30 -80.4 310 
- 4,794 23.4 3,136 -45.9 
1962 93 210.0 7.14 130.3 8,022 67.3 12,292 229.0 
1963 386 315.1 3,071 330.1 9,1-95 10.4 13,171 7.2 
1961. 653 70.0 5,133 67.3 14,610 53.9 15,350 16.5 
1965 1,1 70.2 7,579 47.7 18,909 29.4 26,029 69.6 
1966 1,555 40.0 8,798 16.1 22,338 18.1 29,929 15.0 
1967 3,819 145.6 12,768 45.1 25,474 14.0 31,613 5.6
 
1968 6,225 63.o 11,568 
-9.4 26,675 4.7 37,796 19.6
 
19.69 8,832 41.9 27,807 140.4 - - 49,534 31.1 
1970 12,882 45.9 44,807 61.1 
­
- 7,4147 16.0 
Source : Agri iltural Yearbook 1969 and AERI. 
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Along with other characteristics of farming in Korea, low wage rates
 
relative to the rest of the world tended in the past to discourage Korean
 
farmers from introducing agricultural equipment and encouraged continuation
 
of labor-intensive methods. As domestic wages rose without offsetting
 
increases in the exchange rate, duties, or foreign prices, machinery became
 
more and more profitable to adopt.
 
Since 1965 farm wage rates have increased much faster than either
 
imported or domestically-produced equipment prices, thereby making mechani­
zation more and more profitable.
 
The small size of Korean farms has prevented farmers from utilizing
 
large farm equipment efficiently and from accumulating enough saving to pay
 
the purchase price of relatively expensive farm equipment. While the
 
percentage of farms under one chongbo in size has declined from 73 percent
 
in 1960 to 66.4 percent in 1969, the fact remains that about two-thirds of
 
the farms cultivate less than 2.5 acres. Only 1.6 percent of the farms
 
cultivate more than 7.5 acres.
 
Economic trends encouraging mechanization. Korean agriculture is
 
no longer a labor-surplus sector. At the beginning of the decade Korea was
 
characterized as a labor surplus economy with large amounts of redundant
 
labor in the agricultural sector. By the end of the period this situation
 
was radically different. The high rate of economic growth, particularly in
 
manufacturing but also in the other non-agricultural sectors, resulted in
 
a migration of labor out of the agricultural sector. Through this process
 
the redundant labor supply has been absorbed. This can be demonstrated by
 
observing the real wage rate. In a surplus labor economy, the migration of
 
labor out of agriculture and into the non-agriculture sectors would not
 
effect the real wage since the labor was redundant. However, once the
 
redundant labor had been absorbed by the non-agriculture sectors, additional
 
outmigration would result in increases in the real wage. The real agricul­
tural wage remained constant from 1959 to 1962. Since 1962 the real wage has
 
risen each year. The 1969 level was about 50 percent above the 1962 level.
 
This supports the contention that Korea has moved beyond a labor surplus
 
economy stage and is now an economy where >,bor is scarce. In such an economy,
 
labor saving mechanization frees labor to move to alternative areas of higher
 
productivity, e.g., manufacturing.
 
The trends of the 1960's and the projections of the TFYP demonstrate
 
the fundamental structural changes that are occurring and are expected to
 
continue in Korea. These trends all point toward the need for increasing
 
labor productivity in agriculture and the substitution of non-labor inputs
 
for the previously cheap and plentiful labor. Substantial movement in this
 
direction has already been underway for a number of years. Up to the present,
 
farm input substitution has largely taken ;the form of chemical inputs
 
although a significant amount of mechanization also has occurred. Increased
 
utilization of chemical inputs is expected to continue.
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Farm input prices have changed very disproportionately since 1965
with farm machinery prices increasing from 50 to 75 percent while by
October 1970 farm wages had increased nearly 200 percent. 
Thus, the changes
in input prices have encouraged mechanization markedly.
 
The shortage of labor and the rise in farm wage rates are particularly
significant for the largest farms where mechanization is most likely to take
place. 
The percent of hired labor used increases sharply as the size of farms
increases, rising from about 12 percent on farms of less than 0.5 chongbo to
above 40 percent on farms of over 2 chongbo.
 
The share of total labor contributed by the family declines steadily
as the size of the farm increases, falling from nearly 84 percent on the
smallest farms to slightly under 50 percent on the largest farms. 
Hired labor
costs, 
 therefore, are a larger part of production costs on large farms than
on small farms, thus forcing the larger farmers to consider labor saving
devices as farm wage rates rise more rapidly than equipment prices.
 
Credit for Farm Equipment. Until recently the demand for credit for
farn 
equipment or machinery has been a relatively small element of total
credit needs. 
There was a general surplus of rural labor and most tasks were
performed by labor intensive methods. 
 The 1964 credit survey indicated that
farmers used only 1.6 percent of their borrowed funds for farm machinery.
Another 14 percent was used for large equipment, processing facilities,
buildings or other capital expenditures. 
Of total capital expenditures per
farm, 
onay 4.9 percent was for farm implements in 1964. 
In short, credit
needs for 2arm machinery were relatively small in 1964. 
Table 10 shows that
loans for agricultural equipment have increased somewhat faster than total
agricultural credit since 1965.
 
TABLE 10
 
OUTSTANDTNG AGRTC:,fJ. 
 JRAL AND AGRICULTURAL EUIFMENT LOANs 196 -0 
Outstanding Agricultural Million won
TotalAgricultural equipment loans 
 Per cent outstanding
equipment in Million

Year of agriculture
loans U.S. dollars2I Index Total loans
 
1965 6,562 24.2 100.0 35.5 28,491 
1966 7,553 27.9 115.1 35.2 
 21,437
 
1967 9,728 
 35.5 148.2 38.1 
 25,547
 
1968 14,038 50.0 
 213.9 36.6 38,367
 
1969 24,000 
 83.3 365.7 38.1 
 62,910
 
1970 a/ 31,273 100.5 
 476.5 
 39.2 79,811 
a/ October. 
_/ Converted at annual average exchange rate. 
Source: BOK, Monthly Economic Statistics. 
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By 1970 the needs for farm machinery had changed considerably because
of: (1) the out-migration of younger persons from rural areas; 
(2) greater

reliance 
on power sprayers and threshers; and (3) the need for mechanized
tilling and transportation equipment. 
As out-migration continues and crop
yields continue to increase there will be an additional need for mechanical
 
grain drying and harvesting equipment.
 
Out-migration of labor from agriculture and substitution of labor­
saving machinery for the departed labor will raise land and labor produc­tivity and will reduce production cost per unit of output.
 
Because farm implements are costly, relative to average farm income,
the need for credit to finance them is crucial to any effort toward mechani­
zation. Even a continuation of current trends in the demand for farm
implements will require a substantial amount of credit.
 
Table 11 sho s how 
the NACF, the major supplier of the large farm
equipment, has expanded its sales. 
 After the drought years of 1967 and 1968,
NACF expanded direct sales (stated in 1965 constant prices) by 104 percent
in 1969 and another 36 percent in 1970. Direct sales are those under which
NACF provides credit for approximately 50 percent of the value of the

equipment. 
Consignment sales are made by local cooperatives selling on

commission for local manufacturers. 
 The local cooperatives provide their
owm credit programs for these sales, but the credit supplied is probably

not more than 10 percent of the value of the implements. A considerably
larger volume of business could be done if credit were available: (1) to

manufacturers, 
,so they could produce and display more items; and
 
(2) to farmers for purchase of needed items.
 
It is estimated that investment in mechanization during the TFYP

will be $80.Lillion equivalent Approximately 60 percent of that investment,
i.e. $47.9 million, will be in the form of credit. 
Based on the average,

annual rate at which XACF increased its supply of credit for mechanization
in the period 1964-1969, the amount to be available during the TFYP will
be about $20.4 million, vs. requirements of $48 million (see Table 12).
The resulting gap of $27.5 million will be partially filled by this loan;
the tentative allocation of $8 million equivalent would meet requirements
for roughly 18 months. Additional sources 
af financing remain to be
 
identified.
 
2. Thu Storage Deficiency
 
The grain storage deficiency is very costly to the Korean economy
in foreign exchange. 
 The losses which could be avoided by an investment
expenditure of about $33.5 million equivalent in improved grain storage
facilities are expected to cost the economy from $46 million to $52 million

annually in additional food imports during the TFYP.
 
TABLE 11 
NACF FAR11 IMPIERENT/TOOL BUSINESS 2! 
1000 Won
 
1967 1968 1969 (Est.) 1970
 
Item Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value
 
Direct Purchase
 
Power tillers 
 2,160 582,724 2,450 671,72,7 2,921 833,100 3,581 1,210,376

Power duster/sprayer 1,982 81,564 1,168 50,715 12,884 544,400 24,000 1,008,000 
Power sprayer 2,000 233,800

Motors 
 253 20,900
 
Power thresher 
 19 1,500

Hand sprayer 
 37,500 300,000 
Sub-Total 664,288 722,442 1,633,700 2,518,376 
Consignment Sales 
Shoulder sprayers 26,145 94,457 32,827 126,253 34,641 236,300
 
Power dusters 4 384 710 46,700

Power sprayers 6,002 6,443 1,728 12,573 10,539 82,200

Weeders 7,935 2,661 1,430 10,993 9,472 3,700

Threshers 1,062 7,205 10,037 3,790 2,339 31,600
Straw mat machine 6 60 233 4,237 Not Available 
Fans 786 1,213 852 1,725 
Hand tools/other 119,135 8,814 129,806 12,321 22,700
 
Plows 550 73 915 128 6,893 14,500
 
Potato cutter 1,070 237 1,172 2,903

Hand sprayer 793 2,566 237 622 374 2,000

Decorticator 20 2,588 157 2,278
 
Feed mixing machine 119 20,202

Carts/carriers 
 12,22 78,000
Sub-Total 333,475 198,025 417,700 721,600 
Granid Total - 897,763 920,467 2.051,500 3,239,970 
_V Current prices. Source: NACF. 
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'i, '. T, 
Year 
1970 
1972_/ 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Total 
1972-76Note: 
j 
bI 
f APT)7i---:ly'' 
Ac LIM. 
proj,:ctCd 
equ:ipnrit 
crcdit iJ (ntii.on .,r) 
1;,256 
l,278 
1,302 

1,325 
1,349 
1,373 

6,627
=c 
$o i!32;.. 
Esimr~.tq.. Y"i;D-
priceos ciud: 
Estix~iat by .CF 
Assur.(s ,,...:.c 
TABLE 12 
* ~ V'' CIA J7 TF 
,11d 
Crdi 
'..c rnOrj rcquirzed 
(::,dit for 
U. . nichai 
Thrz;Vi z,:,io:' 
3.9 
3.9 
4.0 

4.1 

4.2 

4.2 
20.41, 
1969 
-
7. j 
3. 1. 
9.1 
10.3 

12.3 

47.9M s'.. 
constant priccs 
Mecchani 
zation 
crcdit 
gap 
3.9 
/4.4 
5.0 
6.1
 
8.1
 
27.5 
of 1,390 million 'bon in 1965 
som,,e non-cciuiwaent loans. (;inex B-2 Table 7)
Loan ?]azring Department. 
ored:ii, does not increase 
in 1971 bcc5..:c of credit squeeze. 
Assuaies 196;--69 trend of increase in credit
continu.s at 1.8/o annually. 
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From 39 percent to 45 percent of the existing storage capacity is
 
Class C, unsuitable for food storage. 
About 50 percent of NACF facilities and
 
37.6 percent of private facilities are substandard. It is estimated that elim­
ination of the storage deficit as of 1971 would require an investment of
 $8.1 million in the public sector; private sector storage requirements need
 
detailed study. In terms of the value of imported grains, the annual impact

of this investment would not only be about 1.5 timLs the investment required,

but, year after year throughout the economic life of the warehouses, would
 
continue to keep the food grain imports as much as 33 percent below the level
 
which otherwise would be necessary.
 
Off-farm storage is required for the 50 percent of the rice production

which is not consumed by the farm population. About 44 percent of the grain

marketed is released from farms during the 3-month period of November through

January following the harvest; the remainder gradually thereafter. During

the TFYP, the portion of production consumed on the farm is expected to
 
ecline to about 44 percent, chiefly because of the reduction of the farm
 
population. Of the remaining percentage entering commercial markets, the
 
portion handled by public agencies 
- primarily NACF - probably will increase
 
from about 30 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in 1976. This will result from
 
MAF's price stabilization program, which is expected to make grain storage

somewhat less profitable for private firms. Thus, additional improved

storage will be needed at the ri-dong level.
 
NACF has embarked on a long-term program to consolidate its storage

warehouse facilities into fewer total centers as part of its cooperative

consolidation program to reduce the number of cooperatives from 16,000 in
 
1968 to 1,500 in 1974. 
This program generally is consistent with the recom­
mendations of a 1966 study conducted for USAID/Korea on reform of the
 
cooperative system. 
The plan calls for 1,500 100-pyong warehouses costing

approximately $13,300 each. 
Of these, 310 have been constructed. NACF had
 
originally planned to complete construction of the remaining 1,190 facilities
 
by 1974, at an estimated cost of $15.9 million. 
Due to the lack of financing

the target date for completing the program would have to be extended to 1977,

unless additional credit is available. 
The allocation of additional credit
 
under this loan would permit NACF tu complete construction of the storage

facilities by the original date of 1974. 
It is estimated that NACF will be
 
able to provide a maximum of $6.8 million for the program, leaving a gap

of $9.1 million, or about $3 million per year over the construction time.
 
The tentative allocation of $6 million equivalent from this loan would cover
 
the gap for two of the three years.
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IV. Loan Justification: 
 Balance of Payments; and Debt Service Considerations
 
The $14 million loan will also assist Korea with its sizeable BOP gap by

financing current account agricultural import requirements. Such dollar financ­
ing together with utilizing the local currency generated to provide agricultural

credit to close the grain gap will have a significant favorable impact on Korea's
 
BOP deficit. Of a total BOP deficit estimated to be $648.4 million in 1971,
$147.5 million is attributable to grain import requirements.
 
In looking ahead toward Korea's economic self-sufficiency, a key issue
 
clearly is whether the country's BOP can be managed in such a way as to sustain
 
international financial confidence and thereby insure a continuing flow of
foreign capital. In 1968 and 1969 Korea experienced rapid economic growth with
 
real GNP increasing 13.3 and 15.9 percent, respectively. Although exports grew

in excess of 35 percent each year, the trade deficit increased from $835 million
 in 1968 to $990 million in 1969. The rapid overall economic growth during this
 
period stimulated substantial growth in imports which accounted for the rising

trade deficit.
 
Recently, USAID/Korea has completed a series of BOP projections for the
 
period 1970-74. Using a national income accounts macromodel, three sets of
 
assumptions were examined with different BOP implications. Table 13 sets forth
 
these comparative projections. The assumptions are explained below.
 
Alternative A (Basic Model)
 
The basic model, alternative A, was intended to be an extension
 
of recent trends. That is, a continuation of recent growth and inflation rates,
(11 percent real GNP growth rate and a 12 percent inflation rate) and additionality,
 
a .continuation of the trend in recent years for inadequate changes in the exchange

rate to compensate for inflation. This was an attempt to project what would happen
if recent policy measures to reduce excess demand in the economy were not success­
ful, the domestic price rise continued unabated, and with an increased over­
valuation of the won.
 
The results are a trade gap and foreign capital requirement, not only
greater than that planned for the Third Five Year Plan, but one which would lead
 
to a serious debt problem. The BOP projections in the Korea Rice Loan (489-H-079)

authorized in January 1971 were based on 
this assumption.
 
Alternative B
 
Examined, as alternative B, was the implication of the Third Five Year
 
Plan projected growth rate but with no other changes in the basic model,

alternative A. The growth rate drops to a postulated 9 percent but the relation­
ship between domestic inflation and the foreign exchange ra'.te stays the same as
 
in the basic model, alternative A. 
In other words, it was assumed that the
 
exchange rate would not become more realistic during the period. It was also
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assumed exports would be the same, perhaps an optimistic assumption in a lowel'
growth rate situation. 
The result of alternative B was a significant improve­ment in the blance of payments over alternative A. 
But, more importantly,
the trade gap and foreign capital requirements continued to exceed those
 
postulated in the Third Plan.
 
Alternative C
 
Examined, as alternative C, was the implication of not only the
Third Plan growth rate, but also, the exchange rate relationship to domestic
prices (or the inflation rate) becoming more realistic. That is, the domestic
price/foreign price ratio improves to equal a 35 percent devaluation in !the
effective exchange rate during the period. 
 There was more significant improve­
ment in the balance of payments. 
The trade gap dropped to $304 million in 1974
 
or about the same gap projected for the TFYP.
 
While there are many variables involved, we now believe alternative C,
based on a 90 
growth rate and an improvement in the exchange rate, represents
the most likely set of assumptions. 
 In 1970 the ROKG established GNP growth
rate targets through 1976 which were considerably lower than the rates experi­enced in the past. 
According to preliminary estimates, 
real growth in GNP will
be about 10 
in 1970 with a trade gap of about $990 million. The Third Five
Year Plan assumes a growth rate of 90% annually, and we believe the ROKG will
continue to take measures to maintain growth rates lower than in the past.
We believe that ROKG officials understand the serious consequences of and need
to avoid an overheated economy with concomitant inflation, adverse balance of
payments effects, and increased requirements for foreign capital. 
No par value
for the Korean Won has been established with the 119. 
 Since March 22, 1965
 a flexible exchange rate system has been in effect. 
The system involves a
market in exchange certificates. 
The Bank of Korea announces a daily "basic
concentration rate" for the U.S. dollar. 
The Bank of Korea is committed to
buying exchange offered to it by foreign exchange banks, but is not obliged
to sell exchange. 
 The rate has been allowed to depreciate but not at a rate
sufficient to offset inflation. 
Now that Presidential elections are over
we also believe that it is likely that ROKG officials will be in a position

to move toward a more realistic exchange rate.
 
Even under assumption C (See Table 14, page 34) with a low growth rate
and an improved exchange rate, the trade gap would be $306 million in 1974 and
net foreign capital requirements would remain substantial, amounting to $590
million. This suggests that even 
though Korea's overall BOP position will
probably improve 
over the next few years, a continued influx of fairly high
levels of foreign capital would be required to finance Korea's economic
 
development needs.
 
It is estimated that Korea's principal and interest payments on
foreign loans of 
over one year maturity will rise from $127 million in 1969 to
$314 million in 1970 and eventually amount to roughly $600 million in 1974(See Table 15). According to USAID projections, annual debt service payments
as a percentage of ROK foreign exchange earnings, are expected to rise from 
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11 percent in 1969 to 25 percent in 1971 and drop somewhat to about 22 percent
 
in 1974. (Foreign exchange earnings include receipts for goods and services
 
and investment income.)
 
In view of Korea's BOP situation, continuation of A.I.D.'s
 
concessional development lending terms is deemed appropriate for this loan.
 
On such lending terms, servicing of this loan will require no more than
 
$350,000 in any one year during the ten-year grace period and a maximum
 
of approximately $888,000 per year thereafter - that amount declining as
 
principal is repaid. With export earnings projected to increase regularly
 
and substantially over the coming years above the 1969 level of $658 million
 
and with Korea's balance of trade gap projected to continue to decline from
 
the 1969 level, it is judged that there are reasonable prospects for
 
repayment of this loan.
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V. Loan Iriplementation 
A. 'WACF and the Credit Program 
In pursuit of agricultural credit objectives, the National
 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) 
 will have the primary
responsibilitv for implementation of the various forms of agricul­
tural credit. Discussions between the Mission and the ROK indi­
cate that the 1,OK',G's planning, with resnect to the implementation of 
this credit program, is fairly well advanced. It should be remembered
 
that tile credit to be made possible by this AID loan is simply an
 
incremental financial resource which will enable the to increase
NACF 

its volume of lending for the purposes of mechanization and improved
 
storage facilities. As indicated in an earlier section of this paper,

NACF has managed an agricultural credit program of substantial pro­
portions for a number of years, and the addition of these credit funds 
should present no administrative problem for the, institution. However, 
to clarify the precise relationships and responsibilities among MAF, 
NACF, and the end-users, (local ri/dong cooperatives or individual 
farms) under this loan, the ROKG (i.e. MAF and NACF) will be required
 
to prepare a detailed plan for the establishment and operation of the
 
credit 
program. In regard to the financing of farm mechanization 
(i.e. equipment), it is intended that the Korean private sector will 
play a significant ,, this will be discussed in a later section. 
The e funds w,.ll be administered on a revolving basis, i.e. 
loan repayments will he recycled. Payment of principal and interest 
will be made frcm NAC to the R0KO in local currency. The terms of the 
NACF's obligatian to the ROKG remain to be negotiated. The USAID is of 
the view that the terms should he the same as A.I.D.'s terms to the 
ROKG; this would allow the credit funds to expand, especially during
tile lO-year A.I.D. grace period. On the other hand, the foreign
exchange risk will be borne by the ROKC and an interest rate differential 
may be required to compensate for this risk. 
B. Credit Procedures 
1. M1echanization
 
At present, nearly all farm equipment sales on credit are
 
handled through NACF, which acts as both equipment dealer and banker. 
Farmers and cooperatives needing credit apply directly to NACF for both
 
the equipment purchase and the necessary financing. However, future 
credit for farm mechanization, including that level formerly provided
by NACF and those additional credit funds provided by this loan will be 
.3T
 
made available whereby NACF or another institutional lender will provide
only the required financing; the equipment sale will be a direct trans­
action between manufacturer and farmer. The manufacturer would 
 have theresponsibility of investigatinp the farmer's credit worthiness anddeciding whether to accept his installment note. The note would then bediscounted with the financial institution (NACF or a commercial bank).Specific details of discounting and other aspects of the proposed arrange­
ment, such as the portion of credit ris] to be taken respectively by the
manufacturer and the financial institution, interest rate differentials,

etc., 
are still under discussion. 
 These details will be contained in the
implementation plaa which is 
to be submitted as a condition precedent to
initial disbursement of dollar loan funds.
 
Terms of sub-loans to farmers will be as follows: 
Interest Rate: %. 
Maturity: 
 maximum of five years, depending upon type of
 
equipment.
 
Down Payment: 30% to 50% of purchase price, depending upon

type of equipment.
 
Collateral: 
 lien on the equipment financed.
 
2. Storage Credit Procedures
 
NACF will review all applications for loans from coopera­tives or other borrowers and determine the need 
 for additional and/or
improved facilities. In 
 reviewing applications, consideration will1begYiven to such criteria as: (a) volume of business conducted by the
cooperative, (b) size of membership, and (c) existing facilities of the

coonerative. 
Borrowing cooperatives also will be expected to provide
land for the construction site and, whenever 
 possible, self-help labor. 
NACF has proposed that loan agreements between NACF andri/dong cooperatives be for a period of 20 years, including a grace
period of five years, with interest at 9 percent per annum during the grace period and 10 percent thereafter. Normal NACF collateral require­
ments, which applied to the construction of 310 warehouses built bylocal ri/donp cooperatives during 1969 and 1970, will be applied to ware­
houses constructed under this loan. 
.,AC" will prepare a status report every six months during
the construction phase detailing warehouses constructed, under con­
struction, planned for construction, and loan applications under con­
sideration. le 
content and for7.at of the report will be jointly agreedto between the MAF, NACF and TISAID. The purpose of the report is to 
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monitor the construction program and determine whether uneisbu:sed 
loan funds should 1c shifted to one of the other two eligible invest­
ment areas as defined by the loan. WhMen all warehouses financed under 
this loan have been completed, a final status report will be submitted. 
C. Dishursement of Ftnds 
It is the 'fission's estimate, after discussions with the MAF,
 
that the demand for credit will result in loan-generated local currency 
being disbursed over approximately an 18-month period, ending in late 
1972 or early 1973. Of the total $14 million, $8 million (equivalent) 
will he needed during the period ending July 1, 1972, the remainder 
thereafter. 
D. Local Currency Generation Procedures 
It is A.I.D.'s intention to generate the local currency by a 
method vhich is consistent with the basic purposes of the loan and 
which minimizes the implementation burden to all parties concerned. 
These aims could biest be met by financing the purchase of a basic com­
modity (or comodities) which Korea must import on a regular basis, 
thereby accomplishing both the purposes of currency generation and BOP 
assistance in a timely and effective manner. It is A.I.D.'s judgment 
that financing the purchase of one or two agricultural commodities 
would provide the most satisfactory results in terms of the foregoinp. 
objectives. This conclusion was reached after givinp consideration to 
other possible methods of currency generation. 
(1) The typical "program loan" approach of financing a broad 
range of machinery, equipment, snare parts, etc., is not felt to be 
desirable because (a) the imnlementation and monitoring requirements 
are burdensome to both the host country and A.I.D., at a time w.hen A.I.D. 
is attempting to reduce its loan-related field staff; and (b) the pro­
curement cycle for a broad range of equipment, etc., is time-consuming 
and would not generate the required local currency as rapidly as is 
necessary for the credit propram.
 
(2) The Special Letter of Credit rechanism is being phased out 
by A.I.D., and therefore no longer available for use in this instance. 
(3) Direct purchase of local currency with dollars is somewhat
 
inflationary and, in addition, would be adverse to U.S. balance of
 
payments.
 
The ROKG is in favor of the A.I.D.-proposed method of generating 
local currency, and has suggested that the loan proceeds be used to 
finance the purchase of U.S. wheat and/or rice. 
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Korea's import requirement for wheat in 1971 is estimated to be
 
,29,000 M/T. Of this total about 61,000 M/T are expected to be
 
supplied under PL )180 Title I sales agreements. Usual marketing
 
requirements (UM13's) are established at 325,000 M/T, leaving a balance
 
uncovered by PL 480 or UMR's of about 328,000 M/T. At $62 per M/T,
 
this represents $19.7 million.
 
With regard to rice, the ROKG quite recently advised A.I.D.
 
that an additional 200,000 to 300,000 M/T above that already purchased
 
would be required this year in order to meet substantially increased
 
demands and stabilize prices. Approximately half of tie additional
 
requirement will likely be supplied by Japan, and the remainder by the
 
U.S.
 
The composition of the CY 1972 PL 480 program has not yet been
 
determined nor have UM's been established. However, we anticipate
 
that Korean import requirements for wheat will increase dur­
ing CY 1972, PL 480 Title I sales will decrease, and a similar situa­
tion as in CY 1971 (with requirements above PL 480 and UMR's) will
 
exist.
 
Although the proposed financing of wheat and/or rice does not 
appear to present au issue, it is recommended that the loan not be 
restricted as to specific commodities; a certain degree of flexibility 
is obviously desirable., U.S. Department of Agriculture agrees with the 
foregoing. 
The ROKG will prepare, as a condition of the loan, a coordinated
 
schedule which gives the proposed timing of procurement, shipments,
 
generation of local currency, and disbursement of currency for credit
 
purposes.
 
The question of maintaining the value of the local currency
 
generated under the loan has been considered. If there is a time lag
 
between the generation of won currency and disbursement for agricul­
tural credit purposes, NACF will either lend the funds to commercial
 
borrowers or deposit it in interest-bearing accounts; the earnings
 
thereon would be attributed in whole or in part to maintaining the
 
real value of the credit funds. In recent years, the rate on short­
term commercial loans has been upward of 20 percent per annum.
 
Further, in the case of farm equipment, the historical rate of infla­
tion in price has been substantially less than the increase in the
 
wholesale price index, which increased by only 9 percent in 1970.
 
Commodity procurement procedures will be subject to A.I.D.'s
 
Regulationl, except where modifications are essential in order to
 
accommodate the special situations of the agricultural commodity trade.
 
As in the case of the previously-cited Rice loan to Korea, A.I.D.'s
 
Office of Food for Peace will provide assistance in the area of pro­
curement monitoring, and will coordinate A.I.D.'s consultations with
 
USDA on various aspects of commodity procurement. Third-country con­
sultations will be conducted, as in the case of PL 480 sales.
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1'. A.T.D. Implementation resnonsibili ties 
The hasic imnlementation responsibility under this loan will 
rest with IiSAID)/]orea. Authority will be delegated to draft, nego­
tiate and sign the Loan Areement, and to issue the basic implemen­
tation letter and other similar documentation. Once the Conditions 
Precedent to Disbursement have been approved by AID/Washington, the 
time required for monitoring purposes will likely he very moderate, 
and no increase in Tission staff will he needed. 
AID/ashington (Office of Capital Development and Finance, 
Bureau for East Asia) will reserve the authority to determine 
whether Conditions Precedent to Disbursement have been satisfied, 
and will have the responsibility of monitoring commodity procurement, 
reviewing and approvinf. Invitations for Bid and purchase contract 
awards, and the modification of terminal dates. No increase in staff 
will be required. 
With regard to RACF's administration of the credit program,
 
A.I.D.'s monitoring responsibilities will not extend beyond the initial
 
utilization of the $14 million equivalent for designated credit purposes,
 
at which point the A.I.D. project would be considered complete.
 
AID-DLC/P-967 
May 21, 1971 
ANNEX I
 
Korean Economic Performance and Prospectsi/
 
The impressive expansion of the Korean economy in recent years

continued in 1970. (Note: figures for 1970 
are in most cases pro­
visional.) GNP grew by 9.7% iii 
real terms, down somewhat from the
 
11.7% average for the period 1965-1969 as well as from the 15.9%
 
achevd in 1969, but still a highly satisfactory level. Although

the decline was 
occasioned largely by monetary restrictions, other
 
factors, in particular poor weather at harvest time, also played a
 
part. The composition of GNP continued to reflect the shift of the
 
economy away froL its traditional agricultural base towards manu­facturing, 
The contribution of manufacturing to GNP, which was
 
only 13% in 1960 and 18% in 1965, in 1969 increased to 25% and in
 
1970, 26%. The agricultural sector's contribution to GNP in the
 
meantime moved in the opposite direction: from 41% in 1960 to 26%
 
in 1970, identical with that of manufacturing (in constant prices).
 
In manufacturing in 1970, emphasis continued to be placed on
 
the development of export and of import substitution industries.
 
Whereas exports in 1969 amounted to $658 million, an increase of
 
35% over the previous year, in 1970 they 
rose to $883 million, An
 
increase of 34% over the previous year*. Efforts to develop a
 
broadly based heavy industry have still had only a limited effect,

however, and 
a very high level of imports continues to be required

to support expanding exports and also, to some extent, to achieve
 
reasonable domestic price stability. Largely because of these
 
factors, 1970 imports reached $1,753 million, $870 million more 
than
 
exports on an f.o.b. basis. Imports in 1970 were only 6% above the
 
1969 figure of $1,650 million, however. The 1969 increase over the
 
previous year was 25% and the average rate of increase for the per­
iod 1965-1969 was 36%. 
The sharp fall in the rate of increase of
 
imports, like the downturn in the growth rate of GNP, is to a con­
siderable extent attributable to the monetary restrictions imposed

in connection with the 1970 stabilization program discussed below,

particularly through its action on the level of investment.
 
While the contribution of agriculture to GNP continued to
 
decrease in relative terms, production in absolute terms is still
 
rising. 
In 1970 the rate of increase was only 2%, compared with
 
nearly 12% in 1969, but both figureswere largely the result of
 
the vagaries of the weather. Despite imports of 540,000 tons in
 
-Prepared by USAID/KOREA, February 2, 1971, as 
Seoul TOAID A-72
 
*on a customs clearance rather than a settlements plus others basis.
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1970, compared with a domestic crop of 3.9 million tons, Korea
 
expects to attain self-sufficiency in rice by the end of the 1970s.
 
Gross investment in 1969 amounted to W451 billion ($1.5 billion)
 
in terms of 1965 prices, an increase of 30% over the previous year.
 
In 1970, however, gross investment dipped to W434 billion in 1965
 
prices, a decline of about 4% largely on account of monetary
 
restrictions. Domestic savings registered only a 10% increase in
 
1970 over the previous year in real terms. This compared with a
 
real increase of 41% in 1969 and an average increase of 36% in the
 
period 1965-1969. The comparison is somewhat distorted, however,
 
by the effects of changes in grain inventories. Further, domestic
 
savings financed a larger percentage of gross investment in 1970
 
(64%) than in 1969 (57%).
 
The monetary restrictions imposed in 1970 were designed to
 
counter the excessive liquidity introduced into the economy in
 
1969. In that year both domestic credit and money supply rose by
 
about 58% and 44% respectively, and the reserve base, which is
 
defined as the assets of the Bank of Korea, by 49%. To these develop­
ments the rapid increase in 1969 of investment, of imports, and also
 
of the trade deficit can at least in part be attributed. In 1970,
 
the expansion of domestic credit was limited to about 26% and that
 
of money supply to about 23%, while the reserve base increased by
 
25%. By virtue of this monetary restraint, significant improvements
 
were registered in the relative rates of increase of imports and
 
exports while the growth of GNP, though somewhat reduced, remained
 
high. Further, domestic savings financed a higher proportion of the
 
sross investment that took place. With respect to price increases,
 
the policy of monetary restraint was less successful, at least for
 
the time being. In fact wholesale prices rose 9.1% in 1970, com­
pared with 6.8% in 1969, and the Seoul consumer price index rose
 
12.7% in 1970 compared with 10.1% in 1969. The GNP deflator for
 
1970 was 14.0%, compared with 12.1% for 1969. To some extent, how­
ever, the 1970 price increases represented a delayed effect of
 
monetary expansion in 1969. In addition such special factors as
 
a hike in the government support price of rice much larger than
 
that of the previous year were involved. With continued monetary
 
restraint, the moderation of the rate of price increases in 1971
 
should be possible.
 
Heavy investments, combined with still relatively modest
 
levels of domestic savings, have continued to result in substantial
 
foreign capital inflows. Korea's external debt increased substan­
tially in 1970, as it did also in 1969. The amount of new debt with
 
a maturity one year and over actually incurred in 1970 was around
 
$725 million, compared with an estimated $681 million in 1969.
 
Korea's outstanding external debt with a maturity three years and
 
over reached about $1.8 billion at the end of 1970. The size of
 
this debt, together with the importance to the country of continued
 
international creditworthiness, call for careful debt management in
 
future years.
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Korea's problems are not unknown is rapidly developing economies, 
and the Korean government is fully aware of their existence. The
 
degree of ec'onomic development already achieved has been due in no
 
small measure to the policies followed by the government. Past
 
interest and exchange reforms have resulted in substantial increases
 
in domestic savings and also have provided incentives for indus­
trial development, particularly in the export sextor. The govern­
ment should also be credited with recognition of the need for long­
range economic planning, with the formulation of three five-year
 
plans and the successful implementation of two, and with fiscal
 
policies and tax reforms which have allowed it to make substantial
 
contributions to domestic savings. It is reasonable to expect that
 
effective steps will be taken to resolve the issue presently con­
fronting the economy.
 
In 1971 the outlook is for a continuation of rapid economic
 
growth but nearer the rate of 1970 than 1969. Assuming reasonable
 
monetary restraint, along with continued expansion of exports and
 
an increase in agricultural output of 4 or 5%, real growth of about
 
10% may be expected. In relation to GNP domestic savings are
 
expected to decline somewhat, while foreign savings will fall to
 
some extent in absolute terms. Nevertheless gross investment will
 
rise absolutely, reversing the 1970 trend, even though not in re­
lation to GNP. The trends of 1971 may generally be expected to
 
continue in 1972
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STATUTORY CRITERIA CHECKLIST FOR DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE: Development Loan Fund 
COUNTRY PERFORMANCE 
A. Programs Towards Country Goals 
1. FAA Sec. 201(b)(5), 201(b)
(7), 201(b)(8), 208. 
Discuss the
 
extent to which the country is:
(a) making appropriate efforts to 
 (a) from 1960 through 1969 theincrease food production and 
 National Income accounts show that
improve means for food storage and
distribution; the value added in the agriculture

sector increased by 50% (an average
 
growth of 5% per year or a growth

rate of 4.3%). Significantly, this
decade included the two drought
 
years of 1967 and 1968; however,

significant investments have been
 
made in irrigation facilities

which will minimize future weatherinfluences on production.
 
In the past two years, rice prices

have been allowed to increase
 
substantially more than the 5% 
increase allowed in the previousthree years. This increase willprovide additional incentive for
 
farmers to use fertilizer and
pesticides required to increase
 
production.
 
Substantial effort and expenditureis being made to introduce new rice

varieties. One of the goals of this
 
loan is to increase food storage
 
capacity.
 
(b.) 
 creating a favorable climate 
 (b) Korea has t'2ken a number of
for foreign and domestic private 
 effective steps to create a favorable
enterprise and investment; 
 investment climate. 
A liberal
 
foreign investment law was enacted,
 
and intensive study is being
undertaken by tha ROKG of means of

expanding capital markets. 
An
investment center has been establishdl 
(c) increasing the people's role 

in the developmental process; 

(d) allocating expenditures to 

development rather than to unnecessary 

military purposes or intervention 

in other free countries, affairs; 

(e) willing to contribute funds to 

the project or program; 
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The 1969 U.S. Industrial Machinery 
Exhibition held in Seoul produced
 
sales amounting to $4.6 million 
dollars worth of U.S. manufactured 
machinery and equipment. A similar 
exhibition is due to be held during 
1971 in Seoul. 
Domestic investment has been assisted
 
by a number of A.I.D. loans such as
 
the loan to the Korea Development Bank.
 
(c) Koreans are basically a homogeneous
 
people whose society is relatively
 
free and politically stable. Korea
 
does not possess deep sectional,
 
religious or social cleavages. Korea's
 
rapid economic development benefits
 
increasingly larger segments of the
 
population.
 
(d) Korea has wisely allocated its
 
resources in such a way as to maximize
 
its economic development while main­
taining sufficient military forces
 
to insure a relative freedom from
 
threatened external aggression. Korea
 
is not intervening in other free and 
independent nations' affairs.
 
(e) the program under the sector
 
loan envisages the generation of
 
local currencies under a dollar
 
commodity loan to be utilized tc 
accomplish the goal of developing
 
particular areas of the agricultural
 
sector which are agreed upon by the
 
ROKG and the U.S. The currencies
 
generated by the sector loan will
 
be additive and host country contri­
butions of funds will not be a factor
 
in the implementation of the loan.
 
Institutional infrastructure support,
 
however, will be fully provided by
 
the host country. 
ANNEX III 
Page 3
 
(f) making economic, social and 
 (f) Korean land reform programs

political reforms such as tax have eliminated the large land­
collection improvements and changes holding class and have created a
 
in land tenure arrangement; and large number of independent farmers
 
making progress toward respect for 
 who own their owm small farms. The
 
the rule of law, freedom of 
 ROKG has assisted in the establishment
 
expression and of the press, and 
 of a number of farm and fishery

recognizing the importance of cooperatives which have been of
 
individual freedom, initiative, significant assistance to the
 
and private enterprise; independent farm and fishery
 
communities. Our Mission has also 
assisted the ROKG in its efforts to 
reform the equity of tax rates and 
collection procedures. 
These reforms have greatly increased
 
both the amount of taxes collected
 
and the equity with which the program
 
is administered. The promotion of
 
democratic institutions in Korea is
 
covered in detail in TOAID A-994,
 
3/6/67 and TOAID A-1220, 2/26/68.
 
(g) responding to the vital economic, 
 (g) The ROKG has made significant
 
political and social concerns of its progress in its efforts to provide

people, and demonstrating a clear 
 a better life for the average Korean
 
determination to take effective 
 citizen. The Government has
 
self-help measures, encouraged the rapid expansion of
 
small and medium industry, stimulated 
the development of farmer credit unions
 
and fishing cooperatives and has helped 
in many other ways to better the lot 
of its people. (See TOAID A-994 and 
TOAD A-1220). 
B. Relations with the United States
 
1. FAA Sec. 620(c). Is the 

government indebted to any U.S. 

citizen for goods or services
 
furnished or ordered where: (a)

such citizen has exhausted
 
available legal remedies, includ­
ing arbitration, or (b) the debt
 
is not denied or contested by the
 
government, or (c) the indebtedness
 
arises under such government's or
 
a predecessor's unconditional
 
guarantee?
 
2. FAA Sec. 620(d). If the 

loan is intended for construction 

or operation of any productive
 
enterprise that will compete with
 
U.S. enterprise, has the country
 
agreed that it will establish
 
appropriate procedures to prevent
 
export to the U.S. of more than
 
20% of its enterprises annual
 
production during the life of the
 
loan?
 
3. FAA Sec. 620(c)(1). Has 
the government, or any government 
agency or subdivision within the 
country, (a) nationalized or 
expropriated property owned by U.S. 
citizens or by any business entity 
not less than 50% beneficially 
owned by U.S. citizens, (b) taken 
steps to repudiate or nullify 
existing contracts or agreements 
with such citizen or entity, or 
(c) imposed or enforced discrimi­
natory taxes or other exactions,
 
or restrictive maintenance or
 
operational conditions? If so,
 
what steps has it taken to dis­
charge its obligations under
 
international law toward such
 
citizen or entity?
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1. No situation is known to
 
exist.
 
2. The loan is not intended
 
for such purposes.
 
3. No such actions are known. 
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4. FAA.Sec. 620(j). Has-the 
 4. No such situation is known
 
country permitted, or failed to take 
 to have occurred.
 
adequate measures to prevent, the
 
damage or destruction by mob action
 
of U.S. property, and failed to take
 
appropriate measures to prevent a
 
recurrence and to provide adequate
 
compensation for such damage or
 
destruction?
 
5. FAA Sec. 620(l). Has the 5. Yes.
 
government instituted an investment
 
uaranty program under FAA Sec. 221
 
b)(1) for the specific risks of
 
inconvertibility and expropriation
 
or confiscation?
 
6. FAA Sec. 620(o); Fishermen's 6. No.
 
Protective Act, Section 5. Has the
 
country seized, or imposed any

penalty or sanction against, any
 
U.S. fishing vessel on account of
 
its fishing activities in inter­
national waters?
 
7. FAA Sec. 620(q). Has the 7. No.
 
country been in default, during a
 
period in excess of 6 months, in
 
payment to the U.S. on any FAA loan?
 
8. FAA Sec. 620(t). Have 8. Diplomatic relations between
 
diplomatic relations between the 
 Korea and the United States have
 
country and the U.S. been severed? not been severed.
 
If so, have they been renewed?
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C. 	 Relations with Other Nati ons and 
the U.N. 
1. FAA Sec. 620(i). Has the 1. Korea is not known to have
 
country been officially represented been so represented.
 
at any international conference when
 
that representation included planning
 
activities involving insurrection or
 
subversion directed against the U.S.
 
or countries receiving U.S. assistance?
 
2. FAA Secs. 620(a), 620(n); App. 2. No.
 
Secs. 107(a), 197(b), 116. Has the
 
country sold, furnished, or permitted
 
ships or aircraft under its registry
 
to carry to Cuba or North Vietnam,
 
items of economic, military or other
 
assistance?
 
3. FSS Sec. 620(u); App. 3. The Republic of Korea is not 
Sec. 108. What is the status of the a member of the United Nations. The 
country's U.N. dues, assessments or loan agreement will stipulate that 
other obligations? Does the loan only eligible commodities can be 
agreement bar any use of funds to pay procured with the proceeds of the 
U.N. assessments, dues or arrearages? loan. The Loan Agreement will also
 
restrict use of generated local
 
currency to accomplishment of
 
identified goals.
 
D. 	Military Situation
 
1. 	FAA Sec. 620(i). Has the 1. No.
 
country engaged in or prepared for
 
aggressive military efforts directed
 
against the U.S. or countries
 
receiving U.S. assistance?
 
2. FAA Sec. 620(s). What is (a) 2. (a) Korean defense budget
 
the percentage of the country's budget expenditures as a percent of GNP
 
devoted to military purposes, and (b) have risen only slightly from 3.7%
 
the amount of the country's foreign in 1965 to 4.1% in 1969. For the
 
exchange resources used to acquire period 1967-1969 these expenditures
 
military equipment? Is the country were 4.1% of GNP, not significantly
 
diverting U.S. development assistance above the mean for the region.
 
or PL 480 sales to military expendi­
tures?
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(Findings on these questions are to 

be made for each country at least 

once each fiscal year and, in addition, 

as often as may be required by a 

material change in relevant circums-

tances.) 

(b) Foreign exchange
 
purchases of military items were
 
about $3 million over the period
 
1965 to 1968 and accounted for a
 
negligible portion of the defense
 
budget. In 1969 they were about
 
$1 million, or 1% of total imports.

Korean requirements for imports of
 
military equipment have been provided
 
under the Military Assistance Program. 
State and A.I.D. have reviewed
 
Korean actions under the Symington
 
Amendment and have concluded that
 
Korea is not diverting U.S.
 
development assistance or PL 480
 
sales to military purposes. They
 
also determined that Korea is not
 
diverting its own resources to
 
unnecessary military expenditures
 
to a degree which materially
 
interferes with its development.

The Country Team concurs. The
 
following points were among those
 
taken into account in reaching
 
this conclusion.
 
It is United States policy to
 
assist South Korea in developing
 
the capability to defend itself
 
from Communist attack from the
 
north and to counter Communist
 
attempts at internal subversion.
 
We also support South Korean
 
contributions to regional mutual
 
security efforts in Southeast Asia.
 
At present South Korea has 50,000
 
troops participating in the allied
 
war effort in South Vietnam.
 
Substantial military expenditures 
are necessary to support these
 
objectives, and we are contributing
 
to the Korean defense budget to
 
help them finance these costs.
 
Korean defense budget expenditures
 
as a percent of central government
 
expenditures have declined from
 
32.0% in 1965 to 20.4% in 1969,
 
below the mean for the region of
 
27.2%.
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U.S. military budget support 
d3rived from PL 480 and Support­
ing Assistance proceeds has been 
decreasing, and at the same time 
the Koreans have been increasing 
their own military expenditures. 
The self-financed portion of the 
Korean defense budget has
 
increased from 38.1% in 1965 to
 
75.5% in 1969. However, these
 
expenditures have remained rela­
tively stable as a percent of total 
central government expenditures: 
11.7% in 1965 as compared to 15.4% 
in 1969. Korean self-financed 
defense expenditures as a percent
 
of GNP rose from 2.7% in 1968 to
 
3.2% in 1969. 
3. FAA Sec. 620(v). Has the 3. Korea has made no such
 
country purchased "sophisticated purchases, and it is not anticipated
 
weapons systems", disbursements that any such piu chases will be
 
for which are required during the made by Korea during the current
 
current A.I.D. fiscal year? If so, fiscal year.
 
has the withholding of an equiva­
lent amount of A.I.D. assistance
 
been adequately provided for? If
 
withholding iL not provided for,
 
has there been a Presidential
 
Determination that such purchase
 
is important to the national
 
security of the U.S.? 
ANNEX III 
Page 9
 
CONDITION OF THE LOAN 
A. General Soundness
 
- Interest and Repayment 
1. FAA Secs. 201(d), 201(b)(2). 1. The proposed loan contains
 
Is the rate of interest excessive a rate of interest which is con­
or unreasonable for the borrower? cessionary. The borrower has the
 
What capacity does the borrower capacity to repay the loan at the
 
have to repay the loan at a reason- rates of interest to be required.
 
able rate of interest? Is the rate The rates in the proposed loan are
 
of interest less than 2% per annum 2% per annum dui .ng the grace period
 
during the grace period? Less than and 3% per annum thereafter for
 
3% per annum following the grace the remaining thirty years of the
 
period? Is the rate of interest repayment period. The interest
 
higher than the country's appli- rate is not higher than the
 
cable legal rate of interest? country's applicable legal rate
 
of interest.
 
-- Financing
 
1. FAA Sec. 201(b)(1). To what 1. No other free-world financing
 
extent can financing on reasonable institution has expressed an interest
 
terms be obtained from other free- in financing such a transaction.
 
world sources, including private
 
sources within the U.S.?
 
-- Economic and Technical Soundness
 
1. FAA Secs. 201(b)(2), 201(c). 1. The projected sector loan
 
Indicate the activity's economic program activity is economically
 
and technical soundness; does the and technically sound, and the loan
 
loan application, together with application and other information
 
information and assurances, indi- available to the Mission indicates
 
cate that funds will be used in an that the loan funds and local 
economically and technically sound currencies generated thereby will 
manner? be used in an economically and 
technically sound manner. 
2. FAA Sec. 611(a)(1). If sub- 2. The necesaary financial 
stantive technical or financial and other planning has been
 
planning is required, have engineer- completed.
 
ing, financial, and other plans
 
necessary to carry out assistance,
 
and a reasonably firm estimate of the
 
cost of assistance to the U.S., been
 
completed?
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3. FAA Sec. 611(b); App. Sec. 3. No such project or program
101. Have plans for a water or 
 is contemplated.
 
related land resource construction
 
project or program included a cost­
benefit computation? Does the
 
project or program meet the
 
relevant U.S. construction standards
 
and criteria used in determining
 
feasibility?
 
4. FAA Sec. 611(e). If this is 4. This is not a Capital
 
a Capital Assistance Project with Assistance Project.

U.S. financing in excess of $1 million,
 
has the principal A.I.D. officer in
 
the country certified as to the country's

capability effectively to maintain and
 
utilize the project?
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B. 	Relation to Achievement of
 
Country and Regional Goals
 
--	 Country Goals
 
1. FAA Secs. 207, 281(a).
 
Describe this loan's relation to:
 
(a) institutions needed 
 1. (a) There is no direct
for 	a democratic society and to 
 relationship between the loan and
 
assure maximum participation on 
 the cited institutional goal.

the part of the people in the task
 
of economic development;
 
(b) enabling the country to 
 (b) Proceeds of the loan
 
meet its food needs both from its 
 will be used solely to finance the
 
own 	resources and through develop-
 importation of a commodities in order
 
ment, with U.S. help, of infras-
 to generate local currencies for
tructure to support increased agricultural development purposes,

agricvltural productivity; 
 which will assist Korea in reaching
 
the cited goals.
 
(c) meeting increasing need (c)(d)(e) There is no direct
for trained manpower; relationship between the Loan and
 
(1) meeting the increasing need for
(d) developing programs to 
 trained manpower, (2) developing

meet public health needs; programs to meet public health needs
 
and 	(3) the other developmental goals
(e) assisting other important 
 of (e) except that the sector loan

economic, political and social 
 program will in part seek to encourage
development activities, including 
 farm planning, achieve a measure of
industrial development; growth of 
 cooperative consolidation and help
free labor unions, cooperatives and free agricultural labor for industrial

voluntary agencies; improvement of development.
 
transportation and communication
 
systems; capabilities for planning
 
and public administration; urban
 
development; and modernization of
 
existing laws.
 
2. 	FAA Sec. 201(b)(4). Describe 
 2. In the use of local currency
the 	activity's consistency with and 
 to be generated by commodity imports,

relationship to other development 
 the loan is consistent with other

activities, and its contribution to developmental activities in Korea

realizable long-range objectives, 
 and will contribute to the realization
 
of such long-range objectives as self­
sufficiency in food production and
 
overall agricultural development.
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In addition, it will promote
efficiency in agricultural production 
through some forms of mechanization; 
it will also improve balance of 
payments. 
3. FAA Sec. 201(b)(9). How 3. 
As previously indicated, local
will the activity to be financed currency generated by the loan will be
contribute to the achievement of used for the development of agreed­
self-sustaining growth? upon areas of the agricultural sector ­
which among others includes efforts 
to narrow the food i-ain gap and 
thereby helping to achieve self­
sustaining growth and to conserve 
foreign exchange as well, by reducing 
storage losses, increasing fertilizer 
applications, reducing input costs,
 
and increasing output by mechanization.
 
4. FAA Sec. 201(f). If this 
 4. Not a project loan.
 
is a project loan, describe how
 
such project will promote the
 
country's economic development,
 
taking into account the country's
 
human and material resource
 
requirements and the relationship
 
between ultimate objectives of
 
the project and overall economic
 
development.
 
5. FAA Sec. 201(b)(3). In 5. See paragraphs 1, 2, and 3
 
what ways does the activity give above.
 
reasonable promise of contributing
 
to developmenL of economic resources,
 
or to increase of productive
 
capacities?
 
6. FAA Sec. 281(b). How does 6. 
The loan recognizes the basic
 
the program under which assistance 
 need of the Korean people for agricul­
is provided recognize the particular tural development which will enable
 
needs, desires, and capacities of 
 them to utilize to the fullest possible.

the country's people; utilize the 
 extent available agricultural resources.
 
country's Jvtellectual resources to 
 There is at best only an indirect
 
encourage iistitutional development; relationship between the loan and
 
and support civlc education and 
 development of intellectual resources

training in skills required for 
 and support of civic education and

effective participation in political 
 training in skills required for
processes? 
 effective participation in political
 
processes.
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7. FAA Sec. 601(a). How will 7. As previously stated, use of
 
this loan encourage the country's loan-generated local currency should
 
efforts to: (a) increase the flow contribute to improving the technical
 
of international trade; (b) foster efficiency of agriculture and through

rivate initiative and competition; disbursal of local currencies in the
 
c) encourage development and use private agricultural sector encourage
 
of cooperatives, credit unions, and development and use of domestic
 
savings ar d loan associations; financial institutions; otherwise, there
 
(d) discourage monopolistic practices; will be little or no effect on the
 (e) improve technical efficiency of specific development objectives stated
 
industry, agriculture, and commerce; in this section (601(a)) of the FAA.
 
and (f) strengthen free labor unions?
 
8. FAA Sec. 202(a). Indicate 8. The total amount of the loan
 
the amount of money under the loan 
 will be used to finance procurement
 
which is: going directly to private from private sources.
 
enterprise: going to intermediate
 
credit institutions or other
 
borrowers for use by private
 
enterprise; being used to finance
 
imports from private sources; or
 
otherwise being used to finance
 
procurement from private sources.
 
9. FAA Sec. 611(a)(2). What 9. No new legislation is
 
legislative action is required required.
 
within the recipient country?
 
What is the basis for a reason­
able anticipation that such action
 
will be completed in time to
 
permit orderly accomplishment of
 
purposes of loan?
 
-- Regional Goals
 
1. FAA Sec. 619. If this 1. Korea is not a newly
 
loan is assisting a newly independent independent nation.
 
country, to what extent do the
 
circumstances permit such assistance
 
to be furnished through multilateral
 
organizations or plans7
 
ANNEX III
 
Page 14
 
2. FAA Sec. 209. If this loan 
 2. This loan is not directed
is directed at a problem or an 
 at a regional problem.

opportunity that is regional in

nature, how does assistance under 
 Korea is a member of the
this loan encourage a regional 
 Asian Development Bank (ADB) and
development program? 
What 	 is receiving assistance from the
multilateral assistance is pre-
 World Bank. 
Both of these
sently being furnished to the 
 organizations are expected to become
country? 
 increasingly active in Korea.
 
C. Relation to U.S. Economy
 
-- Employment, Balance of Payment,
 
Private Enterprise
 
1. FAA Secs. 201(b)(6); 102,

Fifth. 	 1. There is no adverse effect from
What are the possible

effects of this loan on U.S. 	
this loan on the U.S. economy or on
 
areas of substantial la'-jr surplus.
economy, with special reference 
 The U.S. will be an eligible source
to areas of substantial labor sur-
 country of commodities made eligible
plus? Describe the extent to 
 under the loan. 
Also, 50/50 shippingwhich assistance is constituted of 
 will apply.

U.S. coTmmodities and services,

furnished in a manner consistent
 
with improving the U.S. balance of
 
payments position?
 
2. FAA Secs. 612(b), 636(h). 2. The loan proceeds will be
What steps have been taken to 
 used exclusively to generate local
assure that, to the maximum extent 
 currencies. 
 The use of the sector
possible, foreign currencies owned 
 loan technique takes into account
by the U.S. and local currencies availabilities of U.S. and Korean
contributed by the country are 
 owned local currencies and under­utilized to meet the cost of 

contractual and other services, 
takes a program which is additive to
 
projected uses 
of those currencies.

and that U.S.foreign owned
 
currencies are utilized in lieu
 
of dollars?
 
3. FAA Sec. 601(d); App. Sec. 
109. 	 3. This is not a capital
If this loan is for a capital project, nor are such services
project, to what extent has the 
 contemplated.

Agency encouraged utilization of
 
engineering and professional services
 
of U.S. firms and their affiliates?
 
If the loan is to be used to finance
 
direc- costs for construction, will
 
any of the contractors be persons
 
other than qualified nationals of
 
the country or qualified citizens of
 
the U.S.? If so, has the required
 
waiver been obtained?
 
4. FAA Sec. 608(a). Provide 

information on measures to be taken 

to utilize U.S. Government excess 

personal property in lieu of the 

procurement of new items, 

5. FAA Sec. 602. What efforts 

have been made to assist U.S. small 

busine,,ss to participate equitably
in furnishing of commodities and 
services financed by this loan? 

6. FPA Sec. 621. If the loan 
provides technical assistance, how 
is private enterprise on a contract 
basis utilized? If the facilities 

of other Federal agencies will be
 
utilized, in what ways are they
 
particularly suitable; ar, they

competitive with private enterprise
 
(if so, explain); and how can they
 
be made available without undue
 
interference with domestic program?
 
7. FAA Sec. 611(c). If this 

loan involves a contract for 

construction (that obligates in
 
excess of $100,000), will it be
 
on a competitive basis? If not,

what factors make that impractica­
ble?
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4. Excess property has no
 
relation to the fi ancing of
 
commodity imports under the loan
 
or to expenditure of local
 
currencies generated thereby.
 
However, in the event that U.S.
 
excess property might have a use
 
in a project developed under the
 
sector loan acquisition would be
 
considered.
 
5. Commodity procurement under
 
the loan will be limited to established
 
A.I.D. procurement procedures and
 
will follow normal commercial trade 
practices to the maximum extent
 
allowable, thereby assisting U.S.
 
small business to participate in
 
furnishing the commodities to be
 
financed.
 
6. The loan does not provide

technical assistance. Facilities
 
of no U.S. agencies will be used to
 
assist AID in the sector loan.
 
7. The loan does not involve
 
such a construction contract.
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-- Procurement
 
1. FAA 3ec. 604(a). Will 1. 
Commodity procurement
commodity procurement be restricted 
 under this loan will adhere to the
to U.S. excepb as otherwise deter-
 President's directives regarding
mined by the President? 
 the untying of AID procurement
 
as set forth in applicable AID
 
Regulations.
 
2. FAA Sec. 604(b). Will any 
 2. No.
part of this loan be used for bulk
 
commodity procurement at adjusted

prices higher than the market
 
price prevailing in the U.S. at
 
time of purchase?
 
3. FAA Sec. 604(e). Will any 
 3. No.
 part of this loan be used for pro­
curement of any agricultural

commodity or product thereof out­
side the U.S. when the domestic
 
price of such commodity is less
 
than parity?
 
D. Unrelated Requirements
 
1. FAA Sec. 201(b). Is the 
 1. Yes.
 
country among the 20 countries in
 
which development loan funds may

be used to make loans in this
 
fiscal year?
 
2. App. Sec. 112, Does the 
 2. Not applicable.
loan agreement provide, with
 
respect to capital projects, for
 
U.S. approval of contract terms
 
and firms?
 
3. FAA Sec. 620(k). If the 
 3. Not applicable.
loan is for construction of a
 
productive enterprise, with
 
respect to which the aggregate

value of assistance to be furnished
 
will exceed $100 million, what
 
preparation has been made to obtain
 
the express approval of Congress?
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CAPITAL ASSISTANCE LOAN AUTHORIZATION
 
Provided from Development Loan Funds
 
(Korea: Agricultural Credit Loan)
 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Administrator of the Agency
 
for International Development (hereinafter called "A.I.D.") by the Foreign
 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and delegations of authority issued
 
thereunder, I hereby authorize the establishment of a loan pursuant to
 
Part I, Chapter 2, Title I, the Development Loan Fund, to the Government of
 
the 	Republic of Korea (Borrower) of up to Fourteen Million Dollars
 
($11,000,000) to finance the foreign exchange costs of commodity imports
 
which will generate won local currency which in turn will be utilized to
 
provide credit financing for (1) farmers wishing to buy farm equipment, and
 
(2) upgrading agricultural commodity warehousing facilities.
 
1. 	Interest and Terms of Repayment
 
The interest on this Loan shall be two percent (2%) per annum for the
 
first ten (10) years of the loan and three percent (3%) per annum for the
 
remainder of the term of the loan. 
The loan shall be repaid within forty
 
(h10) years from the date of the first disbursement under the loan, including
 
a grace period of ten (10) years, on the basis of level semi-annual install­
ments of principal and interest during the repayment period. Terms of repay­
ment to the Borrower from a revolving credit fund or funds established with
 
local currency generations shall be subject to A.I.D. approval.
 
2. 	Currency of Repayment
 
Provision shall be made for repayment of the loan and payment of the
 
interest in United States dollars.
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3. Other Terms
 
Source: Commodities financed under this loan shall be of U.S. source
 
and origin. The eligibae source for commodity-related services shall be
 
the U.S., except that (i) for ocean freight, subject to the limitations
 
of the U.S. Cargo Preference Law, countries in A.I.D. Geographic Code 941
 
shall also be eligible sources, and (ii) for marine insurance, subject to
 
U.S. law and A.I.D. r( ulations, countries in such Code 941 and the Borrow­
ing country shall also be eligible sources. 
Ii. Conditions Precedent to Disbursement 
The loan shall provide that, unless A.I.D. shall otherwise agree in
 
writing, as conditions precedent to the first disbursement of the loan,
 
there shall be presented to A.I.D. in form and substance satisfactory to
 
A.I.D.:
 
a. A comprehensive statement of the loan inplementation procedures
 
which the Borrower through the Ministrj of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF)
 
and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), and/or the
 
Korean private sector, as appropriate, will follow with regard to the
 
financing of construction of storage facilities and farm equipment sales.
 
This shall include a comprehensive statement of the loan implementation pro­
cedures as regards the relationships and responsibilities among the Borrower,
 
!AF, NACF, and end-users of won-financed items, together with the contem­
plated terms, which shall be subject to A.I.D. approval, of financing
 
extended to farmers and farm-support organizations.
 
b. A plan for the allocation of wvn proceeds generated under the loan.
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c. A coordinated schedule which details the proposed timing of
 
commodity procurement, shipments, generation of local currency, and dis­
bursemc%.t 
of currency for credit purposes.
 
5. Covenants
 
Unless A.I.D. shall otherwise agree in writing, the Borrower shall con­
venant that:
 
a. The Borrower, MAF and NACF shall comply with all of the terms and
 
conditions of the comprehensive implementation plan provided in satisfac­
tion of the conditions precedent to disbursement, and, to the extent that
 
Korean private lending institutions participate in the credit program being
 
financed by this loan, Borrower will endeavor to assure said institutions'
 
compliance with the implementation plan.
 
b. 
Official MAP fertilizer usage targets for calendar year (CY) 1971
 
will be set at least fifteen percent (15%) higher than that of actual ferti­
lizer usage during CY 1970, and fertilizer usage targets for CY 1972 will be
 
set 
fifteen percent (15%) higher than actual fertilizer usage during CY 1971.
 
Borrower will incorporate the target figures in the official supply and
 
demand plans 'or the respective years, and will use its best efforts to
 
encourage the actual usage of fertilizer to the extent and in the amounts
 
specified as the targets for such usage.
 
c. 
The Borrower shall establish arrangements whereby farmers and farmers'
 
organizations 
- as an alternative to purchasing equipment on credit from
 
NACF ­ may obtain financing through domestic equipment suppliers for farm
 
equipment purchased directly from said suppliers.
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6. 	Other Terms and Conditions
 
The loan shall be subject to such other terms and conditions as
 
A.I.D. shall deem advisable.
 
John A. Hannah
 
Date
 
